PLANNING COMMISSION MEETING AGENDA
Wednesday, February 18, 2015, 7:00 PM
City Municipal Center, 616 NE 4th Avenue

Special Meeting

I. CALL TO ORDER

II. ROLL CALL

III. MINUTES

A. Approval of minutes from the January 21, 2015, Special Planning Commission Meeting

Minutes from the January 21, 2015, Special Planning Commission Meeting

IV. MEETING ITEMS

A. Time Limits for Inactive Development Applications
Details: Public hearing to review amendments to Camas Municipal Code (CMC) Chapter 18.55 Administration and Procedures, to clarify that complete development applications will expire if inactive. At present, CMC Section 18.55.130(D) allows applicants to request that a project be put on hold for an indefinite amount of time without expiring or vesting being forfeited.
Presenter: Sarah Fox, Senior Planner
Recommended Action: Discussion only

Staff Report

Exhibit 1 - Emails from MRSC, Bourquin, and MacPherson

Exhibit 2 - Erickson v. McLerran (1994)

Exhibit 3 - Proposed Amendments to CMC Chapter 18.55

B. Camas Vision Statement
Details: The Camas Vision Statement, which is the product of hundreds of community members who participated in Camas 2035 outreach activities. The purpose of this outreach was to create a vision that captured what citizens' value most about Camas today, while planning for what Camas will be in twenty years. The vision statement will act as the cornerstone of the periodic update to the comprehensive plan document, which must be finalized by June 2016. City Council plans to adopt the vision by resolution.
Presenter: Sarah Fox, Senior Planner
Recommended Action: For discussion only.

Resolution Adopting the Camas Vision Statement

V. MISCELLANEOUS UPDATES

VI. NEXT MEETING DATE

The next Planning Commission meeting is scheduled for Tuesday, March 17, 2015, in the City Council Chambers at 7:00 p.m.

VII. ADJOURNMENT

NOTE: The City of Camas welcomes and encourages the participation of all of its citizens in the public meeting process. A special effort will be made to ensure that persons with special needs have opportunities to participate. For more information, please call 360.834.6864.

PLANNING COMMISSION MINUTES - DRAFT
Wednesday, January 21, 2015, 7:00 PM
City Municipal Center, 616 NE 4th Avenue

Special Meeting

I. CALL TO ORDER

Chair Beel called the meeting to order at 7:01 p.m.

II. ROLL CALL

Present: Commissioner Bryan Beel, Commissioner Frank Hood, Commissioner Jim Short, and Commissioner Lloyd Goodlett

Excused: Commissioner Troy Hull, Commissioner Jaima Johnson, and Commissioner Timothy Hein

Staff: Phil Bourquin, Jan Coppola, Sarah Fox, Robert Maul and David Schultz

III. Elections

A. Election of Chair and Vice Chair
Details: The Planning Commission positions of chair and vice chair are one-year terms, which are generally elected by majority vote each January.

It was moved by Commissioner Short, seconded by Commissioner Goodlett, to nominate Commissioner Beel as Chair of the Planning Commission for 2015. The motion carried unanimously.

It was moved by Commissioner Short, seconded by Commissioner Goodlett, to nominate Commissioner Hein as Vice Chair of the Planning Commission for 2015. The motion carried unanimously.

IV. MINUTES

A. Approval of minutes from the November 18, 2014, Planning Commission Meeting

Minutes from the November 18, 2014, Planning Commission Meeting

It was moved by Commissioner Hood, seconded by Commissioner Goodlett, to approve the minutes from the November 18, 2014, Planning Commission Meeting. The motion carried unanimously.

V. MEETING ITEMS

A. Public Hearing for Zoning Code Text Change (File No. ZC14-01)
Details: The applicant proposes amendments to CMC Ch. 18.23 Planned Residential Developments to allow commercial land uses.
Presenter: Sarah Fox, Senior Planner

Staff Report for Amendments to Camas Municipal Code 18.23 (ZC14-01)
Proposed Text Amendment

Exhibit 1

The public testimony portion of the hearing was opened at 7:17 p.m.

Randy Printz, Applicant's Representative, 805 Broadway, Vancouver, provided public testimony.

Mr. Printz and Staff responded to inquiries from the Commissioners.

The public testimony portion of the hearing closed at 7:37 p.m., as there was no further testimony from the public.

It was moved by Commissioner Hood, seconded by Commissioner Goodlett, to forward a recommendation to City Council to approve the alternative amendments to Camas Municipal Code (CMC), Chapter 18.23 Planned Residential Development. The motion carried unanimously.

B. Public Hearing for Limited Amendments to the Camas Shoreline Master Program
Details: The proposed limited amendments to the Camas Shoreline Master Program, Appendix C, Chapter 16.53-Wetlands will update the wetland regulations in order to comply with a mandate from the Department of Ecology. The city adopted the updated wetland regulations to Camas Municipal Code on January 5, 2015, by Ordinance 15-001.
Presenter: Sarah Fox, Senior Planner

Limited Amendment Staff Report (MC15-02)

Attachment A SMP C-Wetlands (MC15-02)

Attachment B - Ecology 2014 Updates

Attachment C - Email Correspondences

The public testimony portion of the hearing was opened and closed at 7:34 p.m., as there were no members of the public who wished to testify.

It was moved by Commissioner Goodlett, seconded by Commissioner Hood, to forward a recommendation to City Council to approve the limited amendments to the Camas Shoreline Master Program (SMP) as outlined in the staff report. The motion carried unanimously.

C. Workshop for Land development applications and time limits for inactivity
Details: There is an understanding that development applications may progress at the discretion of applicant, aside from the city's requirements to respond and issue decisions. Some applicants request that their development application, after being determined "technically complete", be placed on hold, essentially stopping the regulatory time clock for decision making. The reasons vary, although it is typically requested when ownership of a project changes hands, or there are technical studies that must be conducted in order to proceed. The city is concerned about the effect to the community when a development application is inactive for years, and the vested codes are no longer consistent with current regulations, particularly current environmental regulations.
Presenter: Sarah Fox, Senior Planner

Exhibit 1 (MC15-01)

Exhibit 2 (MC15-01)

Exhibit 3 (MC15-01)

After a lenghty discussion, Ms. Fox stated that she will bring back this topic for further consideration at a public hearing on February 18, 2015.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS UPDATES

A. 2015 Community Development Work Plan (added on January 21, 2015)
Details: Overview of the Community Development Department Plan and Priorities

2015 Community Development Department Work Plan

Mr. Bourquin discussed the work plan and priorities for 2015 in detail with the Commissioners. He also, gave a brief update on the progress made thus far on the 2016 Comprehensive Plan Update.

VII. NEXT MEETING DATE

A. The next Planning Commission meeting is scheduled for Wednesday, February 18, 2015, in the City Council Chambers at 7:00 p.m.

VIII. ADJOURNMENT

Chair Beel adjourned the meeting at 8:16 p.m.

NOTE: The City of Camas welcomes and encourages the participation of all of its citizens in the public meeting process. A special effort will be made to ensure that persons with special needs have opportunities to participate. For more information, please call 360.834.6864.

STAFF REPORT

CAMAS MUNICIPAL CODE AMENDMENT FOR VESTED APPLICATIONS

FILE #MC15-01

FEBRUARY 12, 2015

To: Bryan Beel, Chair
Planning Commission

Public Hearing: February 18, 2015

From: Sarah Fox, Senior Planner

Compliance with state agencies: Notice of the public hearing before Planning Commission was published in the Camas Post Record on February 10, 2015 (publication no. 528732). WA Department of Commerce acknowledged receipt of notice on February 10, 2015 with Material ID #21038.

SUMMARY

There are timeframes that Staff must meet while reviewing applications and issuing decisions, however there are generally no time limits for *the applicant* to progress their project forward, after it has been deemed complete. Essentially, after an application is vested, the applicant controls when they are ready for a decision to be rendered, or they may request that their application be placed on hold, which stops the regulatory time clock. The reasons vary, although it is typically requested when ownership of a project changes hands, or there are technical studies that must be conducted that require monitoring or multiple agencies review.

Staff is concerned about the adverse impacts of the inactive development applications suddenly becoming active again after years of being on hold and the vested codes are no longer consistent with current regulations. The proposed code amendment will provide clarity as to the when an inactive vested application expires.

ANALYSIS

The City adopted regulations consistent with RCW 36.70A.040, which establish time periods for agency actions for each type of project permit application (e.g. Types 1 through 4) and provides timely and predictable procedures to determine whether an application meets the specific requirements. In the majority of the cases, the time period for rendering decisions of a complete (vested) application is less than one hundred twenty days. As a rule, the review of development permits in Camas is well under the state regulated time limits.

As noted in the summary of this report, occasionally applicants will submit a request to the Director to hold their application, and not render a decision. According to CMC§18.55.130(D), this is allowed and is typically not a concern, as the applicants will reactivate their projects within that same year.

Recently, with economic activity in the City on the increase, staff had to navigate through several projects that had been dormant for almost ten years. With some exceptions, these applications were not required to comply with current policies or amended regulations, as they were vested when they applied. There are approximately four applications that have been deemed technically complete, are vested, and are in an inactive status at present.

This recent experience and the desire to prevent future conflicts prompted Staff to seek more clarity within CMC Chapter 18.55 *Administration and Procedures*, as to when a dormant application will be considered expired. Staff proposes to amend this chapter, by adding a new section following

CMC§18.55.130(D) *Letter of Completeness Type II, Type III or SMP*. The proposed amendments are attached to this report as "**Exhibit 3**", titled "Proposed amendments to CMC Ch. 18.55". Staff provided the deliberations of authorities on this topic attached as "Exhibit 1". Exhibit 1 includes email correspondences from the following: Shawn Macpherson, City Attorney; Carol Tobin, Municipal Research and Services Center (MRSC); and Phil Bourquin, Community Development Director. Staff also included the additional information recommended by these authorities as "Exhibit 2".

RECOMMENDATION

That Planning Commission conduct a public hearing, deliberate, and forward a recommendation of approval to City Council.

Exhibit 1
(MC15-01) Permit Expirations

From: Carol Tobin <ctobin@mrsc.org>
Sent: Wednesday, January 14, 2015 5:07 PM
To: Sarah Fox
Subject: RE: limiting the validity of development applications if decisions are not issued

Hi Sarah,

This is in response to your request for examples and guidance regarding limiting the time that a complete application may be on hold.

I'm sure you are aware of RCW 36.70B.070 regarding the determination of completeness for permit project applications. Since the statutes do not provide specific direction regarding what constitutes a complete application or procedures associated with this, it is up to the city to establish procedures regarding complete applications, including any time limit on the expiration of a complete application.

I found a few examples of codes that address the expiration of complete applications:

- Renton Municipal Code sec. 4-8-100 APPLICATION AND DECISION – GENERAL: (C)(4) Expiration of Complete Land Use Applications and (C) (5) Extension of Complete Application:
- Shoreline Municipal Code, sec. 20.30.100 (D) Expiration, 20.30.140 – Permit processing time limits, 20.30.160 - Expiration of vested status of land use permits and approvals, and 20.30.165
- Chelan Municipal Code sec. 19.18.110 - Expiration of applications.

I discussed the retroactive application of this concept with one of MRSC's legal consultants. He indicated that this should be OK if the city starts the time limit now for applications currently on hold and notifies the applicant of the new expiration deadline. In other words, if, for example, the city imposes a one-year limit and an existing application has been on hold for one year, that application could stay on hold for one year more. The same approach would apply to an application that has been on hold for many years. If the city decides on a one-year limit, that application could also stay on hold for one year more.

Most codes address expiration when the city requests additional information from the applicant to make a determination that an application is complete rather than the situation you mention where an application has been determined to be complete, but the applicant requests an extension (for example, see Gig Harbor Municipal Code sec. 19.02.006 - Expiration of complete applications).

I hope this information is helpful. Please let me know if you have further questions.

Thank you for contacting MRSC. Help us improve our services by taking our five-question survey **here**.

Carol
Carol Tobin
Planning Consultant
206.436-3797/800.933.6772 | MRSC.org | Local Government Success

Sarah Fox

From: Phil Bourquin
Sent: Wednesday, January 14, 2015 2:18 PM
To: Sarah Fox
Subject: Expiration of Vested Rights

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Excerpt from Blaine Municipal Code:

F. 1. Above and beyond the requirements of subsections (A) through (E) of this section, all permit applications shall be valid for one year from the date of the written notice that the application is complete. If a final decision by the review authority is not made within this time, the application shall become null and void unless an extension is granted. The review authority may grant a maximum of two one-year extensions at the timely request of the applicant upon the determination by the city that the applicant can establish that a reasonable good faith effort to complete the project application was undertaken during the time that the application was pending. Each one-year extension shall be considered independently.

2. In determining the number of days that have elapsed after an application is determined to be complete for the purposes of subsection (F)(1) of this section, any time period during which an environmental impact statement is being prepared following a determination of significance pursuant to Chapter 43.21C RCW and Chapter 17.80 BMC shall be excluded. (Ord. 2811 § 2 (Exh. A), 2012; Ord. 2728 § 2 (Exh. A), 2009; Ord. 2673 § 2, 2007; Ord. 2554 § 3, 2003)

Phil Bourquin
Community Development Director
Ph. 360.817.1562 ext. 4254
Email: pbourquin@cityofcamas.us

Live, Work, Recreate and Educate

From:	macphersonlaw@comcast.net
Sent:	Tuesday, January 20, 2015 3:35 PM
To:	Sarah Fox
Cc:	Phil Bourquin; MacPherson, shawn
Subject:	Re: code amendment assistance
Attachments:	Erickson v McLerran.pdf; Bellevue Code.pdf
Follow Up Flag:	Follow up
Flag Status:	Flagged

In reference to CMC18.55.130(D), I do not read the code as allowing a developer to unilaterally request an indefinite hold. The reference to extensions of time requires that both the applicant and the City agree to it. In such a circumstance, the City could reasonably impose time limitations. Bellevue has a code section 20.40.510, which deals with "cancellation of land use applications." I have attached a copy. For clarity, we could include an amendment which indicates that any extensions of time have a time limit, and, following this period of inactivity, the City would have the discretion to cancel the land use application.

I have also attached a Supreme Court case, *Erickson & Associates, Inc v McLerran*, 123 Wn 2d 864 (1994). Essentially, the Supreme Court has ruled that local jurisdictions have the right to adopt vesting rules which "suit their particular local needs." There is a discussion on the top of page 874 which discusses the balancing act between the interests of the developer and the interests of the local jurisdiction.

Upon review, if you want to meet and more fully discuss this matter, please let me know. Thank you.

From: "Sarah Fox" <SFox@cityofcamas.us>
To: "MacPherson Law <macphersonlaw@comcast.net>" <macphersonlaw@comcast.net>
Cc: "Phil Bourquin" <PBourquin@cityofcamas.us>
Sent: Wednesday, January 14, 2015 11:08:54 AM
Subject: code amendment assistance

Hi Shawn,
Phil asked that I find a solution, and propose a code amendment that will impose a time limitations on pending applications. Particularly those where an applicant has requested that they are placed on hold. I have searched MRSC and Planning.org, and the web in general and have not found any guidance or examples. Perhaps I am using the wrong search terms?

I attached the draft staff report summary, which is an attempt to explain the problem that we would like to solve. Do you have any suggestions?

Thanks!

SUMMARY

There is an understanding that development applications may progress at the discretion of applicant, aside from the city's requirements to respond and issue decisions. Some applicants request that their development application, after being determined "technically complete", be placed on hold, essential stopping the regulatory time clock for decision making. The reasons vary, although it is typically requested when ownership of a project changes hands, or there are technical studies that must be conducted in order to proceed. The city is concerned about the effect to the community when a development application is on hold indefinitely, and the vested codes are not consistent with current regulations, particularly current environmental regulations.

ity, however, abandons this solid precedent and uses common law to expand the availability of attorney fees. We have consistently left such decisions to the Legislature, and until the Legislature acts to change the current rule, I would adhere to the long-established precedent that attorney fees are not recoverable in a slander of title action. Therefore, I dissent.

ANDERSEN, C.J., and MADSEN, J., concur with DOLLIVER, J.

[No. 60623-4. En Banc. May 19, 1994.]

ERICKSON & ASSOCIATES, INC., ET AL, *Petitioners*, v. DENNIS J. MCLERRAN, ET AL, *Respondents*.

[1] **Statutes — Validity — Presumption — Burden of Proof — Degree of Proof.** A legislative enactment challenged on constitutional grounds is presumed to be constitutional and the challenger has the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.

[2] **Building Regulations — Land Use Regulations — Due Process — Vesting Doctrine.** An ordinance under which a development "vests" with respect to existing land use regulations not later than the date the developer submits a complete building permit application satisfies constitutional due process requirements.

[3] **Building Regulations — Vesting Doctrine — Local Ordinances — Test.** Municipalities may enact their own vesting schemes to suit their particular local needs so long as the schemes remain within the parameters set by RCW 19.27.095(1) and the common law vesting doctrine.

Nature of Action: A developer sought judicial review of the application of a critical areas ordinance to a development project for which the developer had earlier submitted a master use permit application.

Superior Court: The Superior Court for King County, No. 90-2-25053-9, Ann Schindler, J., on April 14, 1992, denied the developer's motion for summary judgment.

Court of Appeals: The court at 69 Wn. App. 564 *affirmed* the denial of the summary judgment, holding that the developer's right to a master use permit did not vest before the critical areas ordinance was enacted.

Supreme Court: Holding that a local ordinance defining the time at which a development vests is constitutional and satisfies common law and statutory requirements and that the development did not vest upon application for a master use permit, the court *affirms* the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Oles, Morrison & Rinker, by *David H. Karlen*, for petitioners.

Mark H. Sidran, City Attorney, and *Patrick J. Schneider* and *Robert D. Tobin, Assistants*, for respondents.

Stephen M. Rummage, Thomas A. Goeltz, and *Marco de Sa e Silva* on behalf of Building Industry Association of Washington, amicus curiae for petitioners.

Patrick D. Sutherland, Prosecuting Attorney for Thurston County, and *Thomas R. Bjorgen, Senior Deputy*, on behalf of the Association of Washington Cities, Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, and Washington Association of Counties, amici curiae for respondents.

David A. Bricklin and *Michael W. Gendler* on behalf of Washington Environmental Council, amicus curiae for respondents.

JOHNSON, J. — This appeal involves the application of Washington's vested rights doctrine to master use permit applications. Petitioners, Erickson & Associates and Ron Danz (Erickson), challenge a City of Seattle ordinance that sets the vesting date for development projects. Under the city ordinance, Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 23.76.026, a

development project vests (1) when the developer submits a complete building permit application, or (2) when the City earlier issues a master use permit without a building permit application. Erickson contends the ordinance is unconstitutional, arguing Washington's vested rights doctrine requires the City to vest development rights when a master use permit application is submitted rather than when it is issued. The trial court denied Erickson's summary judgment motion on this issue and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We agree.

I

Master Use Permits (MUP's) are site plan approval permits employed by the City of Seattle to streamline the regulatory review process. MUP's are "umbrella" or "master" permits, which actually represent a number of independent regulatory components, including environmental impact review, comprehensive plan review, and other *use* inquiries. MUP's are mandatory for development in Seattle; however, MUP review is an iterative process. Developers may have general concepts in mind for development of property, and want to explore various scenarios with the municipality. In response to municipal feedback, project plans change and evolve. As plans develop, the specific requirements of a particular MUP may change. The MUP process makes it easier for developers and citizens to get through the land use regulatory review process by having one employee designated as the applicant's "contact" person.

On July 5, 1990, Erickson submitted a MUP application to the City of Seattle's Department of Construction and Land Use (DCLU). Erickson sought "use approval" for a commercial and residential project it proposed to build in the city. The proposed project consisted of residential units, approximately 4,500 square feet of commercial space, and 43 parking stalls. Erickson did not submit a building permit application for this project.

During the permitting process, the Seattle City Council passed an interim ordinance, SMC 25.09, in response to the

Growth Management Act's requirement that local governments adopt critical areas ordinances. RCW 36.70A.060(2). The ordinance applies to properties with steep slopes or other sensitive features such as wetlands, and prohibits more than 40 percent of applicable properties to be covered with impermeable surfaces such as parking lots, driveways, or roofs. SMC 25.09.

During the review of Erickson's MUP application, DCLU determined part of Erickson's project was located on slopes steep enough to qualify as a "critical area" under the new ordinance. After finding Erickson proposed to cover approximately 80 percent of the property with impervious surfaces, DCLU sent written notice that Erickson would have to revise the project, conform it to the ordinance, or obtain a reasonable use exception from the requirements of the ordinance.

Instead, Erickson filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to challenge the application of the critical areas ordinance to its project. Erickson claimed that, like a building permit, the MUP application vested on the date it was filed. The trial court quashed the writ of review because Erickson did not first seek a reasonable use exception. Erickson then sought and was denied the exception.

Having exhausted administrative remedies, Erickson moved for partial summary judgment on the vested rights issue. The trial court denied Erickson's summary judgment motion. Erickson appealed to Division One of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, upholding the constitutionality of SMC 23.76.026. *Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran*, 69 Wn. App. 564, 570, 849 P.2d 688 (1993). Erickson now appeals that judgment.

II

At issue in this case is whether Washington's vested rights doctrine applies to the filing of a completed MUP application as it does to the filing of a building permit application.

Washington's doctrine of vested rights entitles developers to have a land development proposal processed under the

regulations in effect at the time a complete building permit application is filed, regardless of subsequent changes in zoning or other land use regulations. *West Main Assocs. v. Bellevue*, 106 Wn.2d 47, 720 P.2d 782 (1986); *Hull v. Hunt*, 53 Wn.2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958); *State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue*, 45 Wn.2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954); Richard L. Settle, *Washington Land Use and Environmental Law and Practice* § 2.7 (1983). The building permit application must (1) be sufficiently complete, (2) comply with existing zoning ordinances and building codes, and (3) be filed during the effective period of the zoning ordinances under which the developer seeks to develop. *Valley View Indus. Park v. Redmond*, 107 Wn.2d 621, 638, 733 P.2d 182 (1987).

In 1987, the Legislature codified these principles. Laws of 1987, ch. 104, pp. 317-18 (codified at RCW 19.27.095(1)). RCW 19.27.095(1) provides:

> A valid and fully complete building permit application for a structure, that is permitted under the zoning or other land use control ordinances in effect on the date of the application shall be considered under the building permit ordinance in effect at the time of application, and the zoning or other land use control ordinances in effect on the date of application.

Washington's vesting rule runs counter to the overwhelming majority rule that "development is not immune from subsequently adopted regulations until a building permit has been obtained and substantial development has occurred in reliance on the permit." Settle, *supra* at 40. This court rejected the reliance-based majority rule, instead embracing a vesting principle which places great emphasis on certainty and predictability in land use regulations. *West Main Assocs.*, 106 Wn.2d at 51. "The purpose of the vesting doctrine is to allow developers to determine, or 'fix,' the rules that will govern their land development." *West Main Assocs.*, 106 Wn.2d at 51.

At issue here is an ordinance that regulates the vesting date for Seattle master use permits. Seattle Municipal Code 23.76.026, "Vesting of development rights", reads in pertinent part:

> Applications for all master use permit components except subdivisions and short subdivisions shall be considered under the Land Use Code and other land use control ordinances in effect on the date a fully complete building permit application, meeting the requirements of Section 302 of the Seattle Building Code, is filed. Until a complete building permit application is filed, such Master Use Permit applications shall be reviewed subject to any zoning or other land use control ordinances that become effective prior to the date that notice of the Director's decision on the application is published, if the decision can be appealed to the Hearing Examiner, or prior to the date of the Director's decision if no Hearing Examiner appeal is available.

(Footnote omitted.) SMC 23.76.026. Under the Seattle ordinance, vesting occurs either (1) when a developer files a complete building permit application at any point in the MUP permitting process (known as a "combined MUP"), or (2) when the MUP is issued by the City, even if no building permit has been submitted (known as a straight MUP).

Erickson challenges the constitutionality of SMC 23.76-.026, arguing the ordinance infringes upon development interests and violates Erickson's due process right to be treated in a fair manner by the City. Erickson contends the vested rights doctrine is not limited to building permit applications and the doctrine requires the City to process MUP applications according to the land use regulations in effect at the time a MUP is filed. Erickson further argues land development in Washington has become increasingly complex, discretionary, and expensive and the vested rights doctrine will afford property owners little protection if its scope is limited to building permit applications.

III

[1] Erickson first argues SMC 23.76.026 is constitutionally defective. When reviewing a constitutional challenge to a legislative enactment we presume the enactment is constitutional, and the party challenging the enactment bears the burden of proving it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. Brayman*, 110 Wn.2d 183, 193, 751 P.2d 294 (1988); *Tekoa Constr., Inc. v. Seattle*, 56 Wn. App. 28, 34, 781 P.2d 1324 (1989), *review denied*, 114 Wn.2d 1005 (1990).

[2] Erickson correctly asserts our vesting doctrine is rooted in constitutional principles of fundamental fairness. The doctrine reflects a recognition that development rights represent a valuable and protectable property right. *West Main Assocs.*, 106 Wn.2d at 50 (citing *Louthan v. King Cy.*, 94 Wn.2d 422, 428, 617 P.2d 977 (1980)). By promoting a date certain vesting point, our doctrine insures "that new land-use ordinances do not unduly oppress development rights, thereby denying a property owner's right to due process under the law." *Valley View Indus. Park*, 107 Wn.2d at 637. Our vested rights cases thus establish the constitutional minimum: a "date certain" standard that satisfies due process requirements. *Hull*, 53 Wn.2d at 130.

Seattle contends its vesting ordinance complies with the minimum requirements set forth by this court and by statute. We agree. Under SMC 23.76.026 the vesting point for a MUP application is controllable by a developer, and, in all instances, vesting occurs no later than the building permit application stage. At any point in the MUP review process a developer can file a complete building permit application. The developer's rights then vest and the City must process the proposed project under the then existing land use and construction ordinances.

Because its ordinance complies with the statutory and common law vesting requirements, Seattle argues it should not be required to vest development rights earlier, at the outset of the MUP review stage. Erickson contends, however, the constitutional principles underlying the vested rights doctrine require Seattle to apply the rules applicable to vesting in the building permit context to MUP applications. Seattle's failure to do so, Erickson argues, ignores the constitutional underpinnings of the vested rights doctrine and ignores the practicalities of modern property development.

Both parties agree MUP's are now a critical part of the development process. Therefore, Erickson argues, under Seattle's land use permitting scheme, the need for certainty is greatest at the use review stage and the vested rights

doctrine should protect development rights when a developer applies for a MUP. Erickson's arguments ignore that the City's ordinance does afford developers certainty and predictability required by due process. A developer controls the date of vesting by selecting the time at which he/she chooses to submit a completed building application. Here, Erickson opted for the straight MUP process, under which no vesting occurs until the MUP is approved. Under Seattle's ordinance, Erickson could have protected its rights by filing a building permit at the beginning or at any point in the process. Erickson failed to do so, even though "*[t]he MUP application met all requirements then in effect, and the MUP was just about to be issued*" when the Seattle City Council enacted the critical areas ordinance. Pet. for Review, at 2-3.

Erickson further argues Seattle's vesting ordinance gives the City limitless discretion to delay the issuance of a MUP, so as to bring a proposed project within the scope of new land use regulations. We disagree. This is not a case where the City has reserved for itself the sole discretion to determine the date of vesting. *See, e.g., West Main Assocs.*, 106 Wn.2d at 52-53 (court struck down a municipal ordinance requiring, along with the filing of a complete building permit, city approval of several additional permits before development rights vested); *see also Adams v. Thurston Cy.*, 70 Wn. App. 471, 855 P.2d 284 (1993). Erickson does not argue the City acted in bad faith with respect to Erickson's application. Even absent rigid deadlines, the City is still obligated to act in good faith when processing MUP applications.

Erickson next argues the vested rights doctrine is not limited to building permit applications, but instead applies to other land development permits. Erickson contends the Court of Appeals decision in this case conflicts with prior decisions applying the vested rights doctrine in other contexts. *See, e.g., Talbot v. Gray*, 11 Wn. App. 807, 811, 525 P.2d 801 (1974) (shoreline permit), *review denied*, 85 Wn.2d 1001 (1975); *Juanita Bay Vly. Comm'ty Ass'n v. Kirkland*, 9 Wn. App. 59, 83-84, 510 P.2d 1140 (grading permit), *review*

denied, 83 Wn.2d 1002 (1973); *Ford v. Bellingham-Whatcom Cy. Dist. Bd. of Health*, 16 Wn. App. 709, 715, 558 P.2d 821 (1977) (septic tank permit); *but see Norco Constr., Inc. v. King Cy.*, 97 Wn.2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982) (court declined to extend the vested rights doctrine to preliminary plat applications). In support of this argument, Erickson relies on two cases in which courts have applied the vested rights doctrine to use permit applications. *See Victoria Tower Partnership v. Seattle*, 49 Wn. App. 755, 745 P.2d 1328 (1987), *appeal after remand*, 59 Wn. App. 592, 800 P.2d 380 (1990), *review denied*, 116 Wn.2d 1012 (1991); *Beach v. Board of Adj.*, 73 Wn.2d 343, 438 P.2d 617 (1968).

Erickson's argument is not persuasive. Neither *Beach* nor *Victoria Tower* controls the outcome of this case because neither case involved a vesting ordinance like the one at issue here. *Beach* involved a conditional use permit. The determinative issue was whether a verbatim record of proceedings was required to establish an adequate record for review. The court held a verbatim record of administrative proceedings was necessary to enable judicial review under a writ of review. Because no such record existed, the case was remanded for a new hearing on the developer's conditional use permit application. *Beach*, 73 Wn.2d at 347. The conditional use permit at issue in *Beach* does not support Erickson's argument regarding the MUP vesting scheme at issue here.

Victoria Tower is likewise inapplicable here. Like this case, *Victoria Tower* involved a Seattle MUP application. Appellants argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, the City's application of newly adopted environmental policies to its MUP application violated Victoria Tower's vested rights. *Victoria Tower*, 49 Wn. App. at 763. However, the analysis in *Victoria Tower* is inapposite here because the vesting ordinance at issue in this case, SMC 23.76.026, was not adopted until 1985, approximately 5 years after the *Victoria Tower* appellant's application was filed.

[3] We agree with Erickson that our prior cases apply the vested rights doctrine in other contexts beside building permits. However, none of these cases prevent a municipality from developing a vesting scheme like the one in place in Seattle. Our vested rights doctrine is not a blanket rule requiring cities and towns to process all permit applications according to the rules in place at the outset of the permit review. Instead, the doctrine places limits on municipal discretion and permits landowners or developers "to plan their conduct with reasonable certainty of the legal consequences". *West Main Assocs.*, 106 Wn.2d at 51. Within the parameters of the doctrine established by statutory and case law, municipalities are free to develop vesting schemes best suited to the needs of a particular locality.

Erickson lastly argues the practicalities of modern property development require us to extend the vested rights doctrine to Seattle's MUP process to maintain the balance of private and public interests embodied in the doctrine. Both parties agree land development in Washington has become an increasingly complex, discretionary, and expensive process. Additionally, both parties agree the MUP review process is now a critical stage in Seattle property development. Land use, zoning, and environmental regulations all must be satisfied before a MUP will be issued. The parties disagree, however, on what impact these requirements should have on the vesting doctrine. Erickson asserts the increasingly onerous nature of land use review makes the use review (such as Seattle's MUP process), rather than building permit review, the critical stage in land use regulation and requires the application of the vested rights doctrine to MUP's. The City contends its ordinance responds to the increased burden on developers by creating a process where the developer can control and defer the costs associated with permitting.

Development interests and due process rights protected by the vested rights doctrine come at a cost to the public interest. The practical effect of recognizing a vested right is to sanction the creation of a new nonconforming use. A proposed development which does not conform to newly adopted laws is, by definition, inimical to the public interest

embodied in those laws. If a vested right is too easily granted, the public interest is subverted.

This court recognized the tension between public and private interests when it adopted Washington's vested rights doctrine. The court balanced the private property and due process rights against the public interest by selecting a vesting point which prevents "permit speculation", and which demonstrates substantial commitment by the developer, such that the good faith of the applicant is generally assured. The application for a building permit demonstrates the requisite level of commitment. In *Hull v. Hunt*, *supra*, this court explained, "the cost of preparing plans and meeting the requirements of most building departments is such that there will generally be a good faith expectation of acquiring title or possession for the purposes of building . . .". *Hull*, 53 Wn.2d at 130.

Erickson argues the cost of preparing and submitting a MUP likewise poses a significant burden on developers. The MUP process is sufficiently expensive, contends Erickson, so as to prevent permit speculation and to give the developer a stake in the process that should be protected.

We reject Erickson's argument for several reasons. First, Erickson's cost-based arguments fail because substantial dollar figures alone do not demonstrate a significant burden on developers. The cost of obtaining a MUP varies greatly depending on the complexity of the proposal. It is the relative cost of the application compared to the total project cost that should be considered in evaluating the deterrent effect of the MUP application's cost to speculation in development permits. Second, we reject a cost-based analysis that reintroduces the case-by-case review of a developer's reliance interest we rejected 40 years ago when we adopted the vested rights doctrine.

Third, unlike building permit applications, MUP applications may be submitted at the infancy of a proposed development project. Much of the cost associated with MUP applications may be incurred *after* the application is filed. If, as Erickson urges, vested rights apply to MUP applications,

developers can vest valuable development rights prior to any substantial commitment to a project. Thus, the necessary indicia of good faith and substantial commitment are lacking at the outset of the master use permitting process.

Finally, Erickson points to no cases from this state or any other jurisdiction that support expanding the vesting doctrine beyond its current limits. Erickson concedes our State's doctrine is already one of the most protective of developer's rights.

The City's vesting ordinance strikes a proper balance between developers' rights and public interest. As a project progresses through MUP review, its plans mature and grow increasingly concrete. At the same time the developer's interest matures. The City's vesting ordinance permits a developer to vest development rights, when, in the best judgment of the developer, it makes economic sense to do so. The developer, working with the City, is in the best position to make this determination, and, like the Court of Appeals, "[w]e see no good policy reasons to prevent local governments from providing this alternative to developers". *Erickson*, 69 Wn. App. at 569.

Erickson urges us to "modernize" the doctrine in light of the substantial increase in land use regulations adopted by the Legislature in recent years. We agree with Erickson that Washington has undergone a sea change with respect to land use regulation. However, from this observation we reach a different conclusion.

Underlying the dispute in this case is a newly enacted critical areas ordinance, adopted by the City of Seattle under the requirements of the Growth Management Act. RCW 36.70A. The Legislature's passage of both the Growth Management Act (Act) and the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA) reflects public recognition that the influences of population growth, industrialization, and urbanization require us to place greater emphasis on natural resource protection and urban planning. The Growth Management Act begins with the following legislative findings:

> The legislature finds that uncoordinated and unplanned growth, together with a lack of common goals expressing the public's interest in the conservation and the wise use of our lands, pose a threat to the environment, sustainable economic development, and the health, safety, and high quality of life enjoyed by residents of this state. It is in the public interest that citizens, communities, local governments, and the private sector cooperate and coordinate with one another in comprehensive land use planning. Further, the legislature finds that it is in the public interest that economic development programs be shared with communities experiencing insufficient economic growth.

RCW 36.70A.010. SEPA begins with similar findings. *See* RCW 43.21C.020.

The legislative findings in both SEPA and the Growth Management Act demonstrate the Legislature's understanding that greater regulation of property use is necessary to accomplish the goals set forth in both acts. Additionally, these findings reflect a legislative awareness that land is scarce, land use decisions are largely permanent, and, particularly in urban areas, land use decisions affect not only the individual property owner or developer, but entire communities.

The Growth Management Act imposed substantial new requirements on local governments. Under the Act, most counties and municipalities must establish comprehensive development plans, identify natural resources and critical areas, as well as develop a variety of regulations consistent with the Act and the local development plans. *See* RCW 36.70A.060.170. The Act further mandates that localities act quickly, placing strict compliance deadlines for each requirement. Here, the Growth Management Act required Seattle to have a critical areas ordinance in place by September 1, 1991. RCW 36.70A.060. Given the substantial legislative activity in land use law, we are unwilling to modify or expand the vested rights doctrine unless it is required to protect the constitutional interests at stake.

IV

In sum, the MUP review procedures developed by the City promote review process efficiency and effective interaction between the permit applicant and the City and it maximizes developer flexibility and business judgment. Our vested rights doctrine does not require the City to process MUP applications under the regulations in place at the infancy of the review process. Nor are we persuaded that changes in land use law warrant an expansion of the doctrine. We hold SMC 23.76.026 is constitutional and satisfies the requirements of case and statutory law.

Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

ANDERSEN, C.J., and UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, DURHAM, SMITH, GUY, and MADSEN, JJ., concur.

[No. 60715-0. En Banc. May 19, 1994.]

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, *Respondent*, v. CHRISTOPHER NOEL THOMSON, *Petitioner*.

[1] **Criminal Law — Trial — Presence of Defendant — Right To Be Present — Waiver — Test.** The constitutional right to be present at trial may be waived if the waiver is voluntary and knowing.

[2] **Criminal Law — Trial — Presence of Defendant — Right To Be Present — Waiver — Voluntariness — Determination.** A criminal trial may continue in the defendant's absence under CrR 3.4(b) if the defendant's absence is voluntary. A voluntary absence operates as an implied waiver of the defendant's right to be present for the trial. Whether the defendant's absence is voluntary is determined by the totality of the circumstances.

[3] **Criminal Law — Trial — Presence of Defendant — Absence — Continuing With Trial — Review — Standard of Review.** A trial court's decision under CrR 3.4(b) to continue a criminal trial in the defendant's absence is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.

20.40.500 Vesting and expiration of vested status of land use permits and approvals.

A. Vesting for Permits and Approvals.

1. Permits and Approvals Other than Subdivisions and Short Subdivisions and Conditional Uses. Applications for all land use permits and approvals except subdivisions and short subdivisions and conditional uses shall be considered under the Land Use Code and other land use control ordinances in effect on the date that a fully complete Building Permit application, meeting the requirements of BCC 23.05.090.E and F, is filed. If a complete Building Permit application is not filed, the land use permit or approval shall become vested to the provisions of the Land Use Code upon the date of the City's final decision on the land use permit or approval.

2. Subdivisions and Short Subdivisions and Conditional Uses. An application for approval of a subdivision or short subdivision of land, as defined in LUC 20.50.046, or for a conditional use, as defined in LUC 20.50.014, shall be considered under the Land Use Code and other land use control ordinances in effect when a fully completed application is submitted for such approval which satisfies the submittal requirements of the Director specified pursuant to LUC 20.35.030.

B. Expiration of Vested Status of Land Use Permit or Approval.

1. The vested status of a land use permit or approval shall expire as provided in subsection B.2 of this section; provided, that:

a. Variances shall run with the land in perpetuity if recorded with King County Department of Records and Elections within 60 days following the City's final action; and

b. Critical Areas Land Use Permits shall expire as set forth in LUC 20.30P.150; and

c. Lots in a subdivision or short subdivision shall be vested against changes in the Land Use Code, except for changes that address a serious threat to the public health or safety as found by the City Council when such change is adopted, for a period of five years following the date of recording of the final plat or final short plat; and

d. The time period established pursuant to subsection B.2 of this section shall not include the time during which an activity was not actively pursued due to the pendency of litigation which may materially affect rights of the applicant for the permit or approval related to that permit or approval.

2. The vested status of a land use permit or approval shall expire two years from the date of the City's final decision, unless:

a. A complete Building Permit application is filed before the end of the two-year term. In such cases, the vested status of the land use permit or approval shall be automatically extended for the time period during which the Building Permit application is pending prior to issuance; provided, that if the Building Permit application expires or is canceled pursuant to BCC 23.05.100, the vested status of a land use permit or approval shall also expire or be

canceled. If a Building Permit is issued and subsequently renewed, the vested status of the land use permit or approval shall be automatically extended for the period of the renewal;

b. For projects which do not require a Building Permit, the use allowed by the permit or approval has been established prior to the expiration of the vested status of the land use permit or approval and is not terminated by abandonment or otherwise;

c. The vested status of a land use permit or approval is extended pursuant to subsection B.3 of this section; or

d. The vested status of a land use permit or approval is extended pursuant to:

i. LUC 20.25A.125 (Vesting and expiration of vested status of land use permits and approvals – Downtown projects);

ii. LUC 20.30V.190 (Extended vesting period for Master Development Plans and associated Design Review approval); or

iii. A development agreement authorized by the terms of this Land Use Code to extend vested status.

3. When a Building Permit is issued, the vested status of a land use permit or approval shall be automatically extended for the life of the Building Permit. If the Building Permit expires, or is revoked or canceled pursuant to BCC 23.05.100 or otherwise, then the vested status of a land use permit or approval shall also expire, or be revoked or canceled. (Ord. 6197, 11-17-14, §§ 31, 32; Ord. 6102, 2-27-13, § 10; Ord. 5683, 6-26-06, § 33; Ord. 4973, 3-3-97, § 874; Ord. 4816, 12-4-95, § 974)

20.40.510 Cancellation of land use applications.

Applications for land use permits and approvals may be canceled for inactivity if an applicant fails to respond to the Department's written request for revisions, corrections, or additional information within 60 days of the request. The Director may extend the response period beyond 60 days if within that time period the applicant provides and subsequently adheres to an approved schedule with specific target dates for submitting the full revisions, corrections, or other information needed by the Department. (Ord. 4973, 3-3-97, § 875; Ord. 4816, 12-4-95, § 975)

which may be considered during a preapplication meeting.

B. SUBMITTAL OF FORMAL APPLICATION:

Applications, except appeals of administrative or environmental determinations shall be filed with the Development Services Division.

C. LETTER OF COMPLETENESS:

1. Timing: Within twenty eight (28) days after receipt of an application, the Department of Community and Economic Development shall provide a written determination that the application is deemed complete or incomplete according to the submittal requirements as listed in RMC 4-8-120A, B or C, and any site-specific information identified after a site visit. In the absence of a written determination, the application shall be deemed complete.

2. Applications Which are Not Complete:

a. Notice of Incomplete Application: If an application is determined incomplete, the necessary materials for completion shall be specified in writing to the contact person and property owner.

b. Notice of Complete Application or Request for Additional Information: Within fourteen (14) days of submittal of the information specified as necessary to complete an application, the applicant will be notified whether the application is complete or what additional information is necessary. The maximum time for resubmittal shall be within ninety (90) days of written notice.

c. Time Extensions: In such circumstances where a project is complex or conditions exist that require additional time, the Community and Economic Development Administrator may allow the applicant, contact person and/or property owner additional time to provide the requested materials. When granted, extension approvals shall be provided in writing. (Ord. 5676, 12-3-2012)

3. Additional Information May Be Requested: A written determination of completeness does not preclude the Department of Community and Economic Development from requesting supplemental information or studies, if new information is required to complete review of an application or if significant changes in the permit application are proposed. The Department of Community and Economic Development may set deadlines for the submittal or supplemental information.

4. Expiration of Complete Land Use Applications: Any land use application type described in RMC 4-8-080 that has been inactive and an administrative decision has not been made or has not been reviewed by the Hearing Examiner in a public hearing shall become null and void six (6) months after a certified notice is mailed to the applicant, contact person and property owner, unless other time limits are prescribed elsewhere in the Renton Municipal Code or other codes adopted by reference.

5. Extension of Complete Application: A one-time, one-year extension may be granted if a written extension request is submitted prior to the expiration date identified in the certified notice and the applicant, contact person or property owner(s) has demonstrated due diligence and reasonable reliance towards project completion. In consideration of due diligence and reasonable reliance the Community and Economic Development Administrator shall consider the following:

a. Date of initial application;

b. Time period the applicant had to submit required studies;

c. Availability of necessary information;

d. Potential to provide necessary information within one (1) year;

e. Applicant's rationale or purpose for delay; and

f. Applicant's ability to show reliance together with an expectation that the application would not expire. (Ord. 4587, 3-18-1996; Ord. 4660, 3-17-1997; Ord. 5605, 6-6-2011; Ord. 5676, 12-3-2012)

D. NOTICES TO APPLICANT:

The applicant shall be advised of the date of acceptance of the application and of the environmental determination. The applicant shall be advised of the date of any public hearing at least ten (10) days prior to the public hearing. (Ord. 3454, 7-28-1980)

E. REPORT BY DEVELOPMENT SERVICES:

1. Report Content: When such application has been set for public hearing, if required, the Development Services Division shall coordinate and assemble the comments and recommendations of other City departments and government agencies having an interest in the subject application and shall prepare a report summarizing the factors involved and the Development Services Division findings and supportive recommendations.

[Notice that there are not any changes proposed to Subsection 130, it is only provided as context for the proposed code addition, which is provided as Subsection 140 and underlined.]

18.55.130 - Letter of completeness Type II, Type III or SMP.

A. Upon submission of a Type II, Type III, or SMP application, the director should date stamp the application form, and verify that the appropriate application fee has been submitted. The director will then review the application and evaluate whether the application is complete. Within twenty-eight days of receipt of the application, the director shall complete this initial review and issue a letter to the applicant indicating whether or not the application is complete. If not complete, the director shall advise the applicant what information must be submitted to make the application complete.

B. If the director does not issue a letter of completeness or incompleteness within twenty-eight days, the application will be presumed complete on the twenty-eighth day after submittal.

C. Upon receipt of a letter indicating the application is incomplete, the applicant has one hundred eighty days from the original application submittal date within which to submit the missing information or the application shall be rejected and all materials returned to the applicant. If the applicant submits the requested information within the one hundred eighty day period, the director shall again verify whether the application, as augmented, is complete. Each such review and verification should generally be completed within fourteen days.

D. Once the director determines the application is complete, or the applicant refuses in writing to submit any additional information, the city shall declare the application complete and generally take final action on the application within one hundred twenty days of the date of the completeness letter. The timeframe for a final decision may vary due to requests by the city to correct plans, perform required studies, provide additional required information, extensions of time agreed to by the applicant and the city, or delays related to simultaneous processing of shoreline or SEPA reviews.

E. The approval criteria and standards which control the city's review and decision on a complete application are those which were in effect on the date the application was first submitted, or as prescribed by a development agreement.

18.55.140 – Expiration of Complete Land Use Applications

A. Any land use application type described in CMC§18.55.130(D) that has been inactive and a decision has not been made shall become null and void 120 days after a certified notice is mailed to the applicant and property owner.

B. A one-time, one year extension may be granted if a written extension request is submitted prior to the expiration date identified in the certified notice and the applicant or property owner(s) has demonstrated due diligence and reasonable reliance towards project completion. In consideration of due diligence the Director may consider the following:

1. Date of initial application;
2. Time period the applicant had to submit required studies;
3. That there have been no major modifications to the application or to the site conditions;
4. That there has not been significant changes in applicable regulations;
5. Potential to provide necessary information within one (1) year; and
6. Applicant’s rationale or purpose for delay.

RESOLUTION NO. 15-002

A RESOLUTION adopting the Camas Vision Statement.

WHEREAS, the City of Camas has solicited input from its citizens, City staff, and elected officials as to the respective visions for our community and to create a vision that captures what citizens value most about Camas today, while planning twenty years from now; and

WHEREAS, it is in the interest of the City of Camas to adopt a Vision Statement, which will act as a cornerstone of the periodic update to the City's comprehensive plan document.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CAMAS AS FOLLOWS:

I

The City of Camas hereby adopts the following Vision Statement:

Camas Vision Statement

The Camas 2035 Vision was developed to guide the goals and policies of the Camas Comprehensive Plan. The Vision is written in the present tense, as if we are describing Camas as it exists in 2035. Some aspects of the vision can be found in Camas today, while others represent aspirations for the future.

Introduction
In the year 2035, residents of Camas continue to appreciate their safe, diverse and welcoming community. Those that were raised in Camas will return for family wage jobs, and to ultimately retire here. Camas maintains its small town character while accommodating future residents. Camas is well known for its excellent schools, thriving businesses and ready access to metropolitan amenities and natural features. A vibrant downtown and community events bring neighbors together and are enjoyed by all.

Vital, Stable and Livable Neighborhoods
Camas is a well planned and connected city where residents enjoy pedestrian and bicycle paths between neighborhoods and to downtown. Historic structures are maintained and rehabilitated to accommodate new homes and businesses. There is a wide variety and range of housing for all ages and income levels. Quality public facilities, services and utilities contribute to a high quality of life.

Diversified Economy
The economy has grown to attract a variety of businesses that offer stable employment opportunities

and family wage jobs in the medical and high-tech fields. Camas is a gateway to nature and recreational opportunities, leading to a robust tourism industry. Professional office, medical and industrial uses will typify western Camas, with retail businesses supporting the large campus firms. The north shore area will fulfill the employment and retail needs of the growing population on the northeast side, and reduce trips outside of the city. Downtown Camas retains its historic atmosphere as a walkable, attractive place to shop, dine and gather. Housing within the city's core contributes to a town center that supports local businesses.

Public Services
Camas continues to have an excellent school system, an asset that draws families to the community. Students and their families enjoy the city's parks, trails, community centers and other recreational opportunities. The library continues its vital role as a place of learning. Residents value well-funded police, fire and emergency response services. Proficient government agencies maintain existing city assets and coordinate future development.

Natural Environment
Camas appreciates and remains good stewards of its natural environment. A vegetated corridor provides habitat and safe passage for wildlife from Green Mountain to the Columbia River. Lacamas Lake is treasured as a unique and pristine resource. City policies preserve trees and natural areas.

II

ADOPTED by the Council of the City of Camas and approved by the Mayor this _____ day of _____, 2015.

SIGNED:_____
Mayor

ATTEST:_____
Clerk

APPROVED as to form:

_____
City Attorney